FOREWORD (AND UPDATE)
By Richard A. Booth
The papers in this issue of the Journal of Business & Technology Law were presented at
the fourth annual business law conference at the University of Maryland School of Law
on Friday, November 4, 2005. The focus of the 2005 conference – Twilight in the Zone of
Insolvency: Fiduciary Duty and Creditors of Troubled Companies – was the trend among
numerous courts toward the imposition of a common law fiduciary duty running from a
corporation’s board of directors to the corporation’s creditors in situations in which the
corporation is insolvent or is on the brink of insolvency. On the one hand, this trend
appears to be quite at odds with the traditional idea that the board of directors owes a
fiduciary duty exclusively to the stockholders as residual beneficiaries. On the other
hand, if a corporation is insolvent, the creditors are the residual beneficiaries because ex
hypothesis the corporation cannot pay the creditors in full. The creditors thus have an
interest in any increase or decrease in value of the corporation. But the creditors do not
have the only interest here. The stockholders still have an interest in the possibility that
the corporation will recover by more than enough to pay off the creditors however faint it
may be. Although it is clear that the creditors have an interest here that is akin to that of
stockholders in a solvent corporation, the courts have not often addressed the question of
creditor standing because the corporation is almost always in bankruptcy at that point.
There is also a gap between these two situations. What if the corporation faces a choice
between a strategy that will assure its mere solvency and another that offers the
possibility of a rich return for stockholders but a significant chance of insolvency?
In the 1991 case, Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland v. Pathe Communications
Corporation, Chancellor Allen stated that “where a corporation is operating in the
vicinity of insolvency, the board of directors is not merely the agent of the stockholders,
but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise.” In such circumstances, management is not
disloyal in failing to act in the interest of the stockholders. Rather, management owes
“supervening loyalty to the corporate entity.” It has “an obligation to the community of
interest that sustain[s] the corporation to exercise judgment in an informed, good faith
effort to maximize the corporation’s long-term wealth creating capacity.”1
Credit Lyonnais gave rise to an avalanche of case and commentary as the footnotes in
this issue of JBTL attest. Then, in 2004, Vice Chancellor Strine sought to put the matter
to rest in Production Resources Group, LLC v. NCT Corporation,2 a case in which a
creditor sought the appointment of a receiver for the debtor corporation or direct recovery
from the debtor corporation based on the theory that the board of directors owed a
fiduciary duty to the creditors of the corporation. In Production Resources, the debtor
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corporation had gone to extraordinary lengths to avoid payment to the complaining
creditor while at the same time expending corporate resources on generous salaries and
consulting contracts with the controlling stockholder and further encumbering the assets
of the corporation. The court presumed that the debtor corporation was insolvent as a
result of its inability or refusal to satisfy an apparently valid obligation. Noting that some
courts and commentators have interpreted Credit Lyonnais as creating a new body of
creditor rights, Strine argues that what Credit Lyonnais really did was to extend the shield
of the business judgment rule to decisions in which the board seeks to maximize total
firm value rather than just stockholder value. In other words, Credit Lyonnais protects the
board of directors from an action by the stockholders grounded on the board's failure to
seek advantage for the stockholders at the expense of creditors. The problem is that Strine
went on to hold that the creditor in question did in fact have standing to assert a
derivative claim based on fiduciary duty against the presumptively insolvent corporation.
And he left open the possibility that a creditor might be able to assert a direct claim in an
appropriate case.
At the time of the conference, some of the papers published in this issue of JBTL were
almost finished, while others were almost started. Either way, there have been
developments in the meantime that should be considered when one reads the papers that
follow. The decision in Production Resources was discussed approvingly and at some
length in Big Lots Stores, Inc. v. Bain Capital Fund VII, LLC and Trenwick America
Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P.3 The most significant development was the decision
by the Delaware Supreme Court in North American Catholic Educational Programming
Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, 2007 Del. LEXIS 227 (NACEPF), where the court held
that creditors may not assert direct claims for breach of fiduciary duty when a corporation
is either insolvent or in the zone of insolvency. The court further stated that creditors do
have standing to maintain a derivative action for breach of fiduciary duty when a
corporation is in fact insolvent. The latter statement is arguably dictum in that the
plaintiff in NACEPF did not assert a derivative claim. It is also noteworthy that the court
chose at least in passing to discuss the zone of insolvency as distinct from insolvency in
fact, thus leaving open questions about exactly what the difference is between the two
and exactly when creditors gain standing to maintain a derivative action. Thus, it is not
clear that much has been resolved by NACEPF.
Other questions have not been addressed at all. No one has suggested that stockholders
lose the right to maintain a derivative action in such circumstances. How then should the
courts sort out the competing claims of stockholders and creditors if both groups seek to
maintain a derivative action? Nor is it really clear that directors owe direct fiduciary
duties to stockholders in the sense that creditors seek to assert them. A direct claim by a
stockholder is usually defined as one that implicates some contractual right of the
stockholders to participate in the corporate enterprise. Creditors have their own
contractual rights. But creditors seem to think that stockholders have some additional
mystical right to assert claims for mismanagement that might open a door to a new source
of riches, namely, the personal wealth of directors and officers. Stockholders have no
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such magical powers to penetrate the force field of the business judgment rule or
provisions that absolve directors and officers of personal liability for good faith business
decisions. There is no reason that creditors should gain such powers. Ultimately the issue
is one of limited liability.
The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle asserts that it is impossible to observe an event
without affecting it in some way. The same is true here. The papers written for this
conference have been cited in both Big Lots and NACEPF. Thus, while the circumstances
are no longer exactly as they were when the papers were prepared, the papers are to some
extent responsible for the circumstances as they are today. We hope that will make for
even more interesting reading.
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